CIA adjusts Afghan population estimations

The CIA released a "significantly revised figure" for Afghanistan's population last week. The CIA's new number is 5.2 million lower than its previous estimates.

The inability of the United States to accurately gauge Afghanistan's demographics could contribute to further delay in President Obama's decision regarding troop escalation. General McChrystal's proposal focuses on the protection of civilians under a new counterinsurgency strategy- a task which could be difficult to achieve without an accurate tally of Afghanistan's population. The CIA Fact Book had regularly reported Afghanistan's population to be near 32 million, while other civilian sources were reporting the population to be closer to 27 million. Read more at the Washington Post.

War Gaming Afghanistan

The US Department of Defense modeled the outcomes of the two most likely Afghanistan options available to President Obama this month. The Washington Post reported that these two scenarios were the deployment of 44,000 troops to help the Afghan government gain control of the country, or a more modest 10,000-15,000 troop increase dubbed "counter-terrorism plus."

General Stanley McChrystal drew criticism from members of the administration for publicly espousing favor for a large deployment earlier this month. McChrystal said that he would need at least 44,000 troops to force the Taliban out of populated areas and secure those areas until Afghan forces could take over. Both of the possible troop levels in the war game exercise were based on plans recommended by Gen. McChrystal. The 10,000-15,000 troop increase option would not include plans to force out Taliban shadow governments operating in Southern and Western Afghanistan. McChrystal also included an option that called for 80,000 troops, but this is not getting serious consideration.

Defense Secretary Gate plans to speak with NATO about Afghanistan

Defense Secretary Robert Gates plans to meet with NATO and push for support for training of Afghani security forces. Secretary Gate flew to Slovakia today and cited General McChrystal in the need for more allied support in Afghanistan. President Obama has yet to decide on whether to commit more troops. To read more, click here NYTimes.

The US Cannot Wait for Runoff Elections in Afghanistan

While on his way to Tokyo today, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that NATO/ISAF members should not wait on a runoff election in Afghanistan to increase troop levels, nor, he said, should they expect the US to provide all additional troops. RFU/RL reported today that Gates said that he did not need a US decision about increasing troop levels to talk to NATO allies about increasing their support in Afghanistan.

It is believed that General McCrystal, top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, told president Obama that he needs somewhere between 10,000 and 40,000 additional troops to avoid failure of the NATO mission.

Change in Priorities, Change in Course?

The New York Times recently reported that President Obama was presented with an alternative strategy for Afghanistan which would require considerably fewer troops than General McChrystal is currently requesting. Rather than treating both as an integrated problem, some senior administration officials are proposing that U.S. troops ease prosecution of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan to focus on Qaeda elements in Pakistan. The premise of this strategy assumes that the Taliban would not provide safe havens to al Qaeda should they return to power in Afghanistan and that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would pose no direct threat to the United States. Both Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have opposed this line of thinking, warning that any territory controlled by the Taliban will potentially become a staging ground for al Qaeda.

Ironically, Gates and Clinton are revitalizing an argument that Tony Blair made in 2005. Blair cautioned against placing any faith in the discord between terrorist organizations and rogue states because their mutual enmity towards the United States was more powerful. The fact that senior officials are seriously considering this option signifies that the United States has realized it must lower its expectations if it ever expects to see success. If the Taliban truly is an insurgent organization more interested in territorial control than the ideological aims of al Qaeda, what will prevent the Taliban from resorting to Qaeda elements to help them expel American forces? The United States has already seen radical nationalist elements in Iraq fuse with Qaeda insurgents to conduct operations against allied forces despite their conflicting aims.

The probable result of this strategy will be allowing the Taliban to control at least part of the country. In order to prevent cooperation between Qaeda elements and Taliban forces, the United States will be forced to cooperate on some level with the Taliban, therefore legitimizing their regime, even if only in a de facto sense. This would render the invasion of Afghanistan superfluous. If we are now willing to permit the Taliban to rule certain areas of Afghanistan so that we can better prosecute al Qaeda, we could have achieved this with a few missile strikes and strong-arm diplomacy in 2001. We decided then that any enemy that was willing to facilitate a strike against the United States and harbor those responsible needed to be eliminated. To reverse course now would place the entire allied presence in an untenable situation, something that the United States can ill-afford to do.