The North Korean regime has recently stated that it has finished the reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods for weaponized plutonium. If these claims are accurate, this weaponized material can be used in a bomb.
Many are concerned that the Taepodong-2, a long-range missile, is a delivery system capable of striking North America. With the threat of more weapons materials and the reactivation of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, North Korea hopes to force the United States into bilateral talks where it may acquire aid, and possible diplomatic recognition.
Following concerns over CTBT ratification by some more hawkish political leaders (Sen. Jon Kyl in the WSJ, for example), the United States response to North Korea will be closely scrutinized by domestic critics of the Obama Administration.
Showing posts with label international law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label international law. Show all posts
Tuesday, November 3, 2009
Friday, October 23, 2009
John Bellinger in Washington Post - "The Iran Talks We Should End"
In a Thursday Washington Post Op-Ed piece (also displayed here at CFR.org), former State Department legal adviser John Bellinger weights the pros and cons of continued U.S. involvement in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
The Tribunal, established under the Algiers Accords in 1981, is composed of 9 arbitrators: 3 American, 3 Iranian, and 3 that are either appointed by the other 6, or selected by a neutral party. In his Op-Ed piece, Bellinger cites various points of Iranian friction with the tribunal as a rationale for questioning, or even walking away from, participation in the Tribunal.
One comment by Bellinger, however, implicitly points out the need for caution: "Iran's strategy appears to be seeking to force out the third-country judges so they can be replaced by judges more to Tehran's liking, or to provoke the U.S. administration into a dramatic overreaction."
While Bellinger's Op-Ed is by no means a call for precipitous withdrawal, the ramifications of hasty American reaction (such as taking the "opportunity to close down a diplomatic vestige") could be detrimental for U.S. image and national interest. Instead, what might not hurt is Bellinger's recommendation for making the tribunal's future a matter to be discussed in U.S. - Iran talks.
The Tribunal, established under the Algiers Accords in 1981, is composed of 9 arbitrators: 3 American, 3 Iranian, and 3 that are either appointed by the other 6, or selected by a neutral party. In his Op-Ed piece, Bellinger cites various points of Iranian friction with the tribunal as a rationale for questioning, or even walking away from, participation in the Tribunal.
One comment by Bellinger, however, implicitly points out the need for caution: "Iran's strategy appears to be seeking to force out the third-country judges so they can be replaced by judges more to Tehran's liking, or to provoke the U.S. administration into a dramatic overreaction."
While Bellinger's Op-Ed is by no means a call for precipitous withdrawal, the ramifications of hasty American reaction (such as taking the "opportunity to close down a diplomatic vestige") could be detrimental for U.S. image and national interest. Instead, what might not hurt is Bellinger's recommendation for making the tribunal's future a matter to be discussed in U.S. - Iran talks.
Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Cybersecurity's Need for More National Resources
Today at the Huffington Post, Sarah Granger, founder of PublicEdge, writes about America's need to devote greater resources to cybersecurity. Although Granger's piece addresses America's cybersecurity needs from a broader policy perspective, her HuffPo piece also points toward a piece of legislation that is currently sitting in committee in the Senate.
S.773, the Cybersecurity Act of 2009, was introduced in April 2009 by Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) and currently has bipartisan support with Sens. Bayh (D-IN), Nelson (D-FL), and Snowe (R-ME) listed as cosponsors. Following the bill's introduction, it was referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. While it may take some time to get the bill out of committee, the findings in the bill's full text (see section 2) indicate just how urgent the need is to protect cyberspace.
Even after this legislation (modest in its goals, by Granger's assessment) is passed, there are many major challenges that face a good domestic policy. For example: Section 21 of the Bill, International Norms and Cybersecurity Deterrance Measures, speaks to the need to work with other states and foreign institutions, so that cyberlaw can coherrently govern activity that affects multiple states. Nevertheless, as Granger suggests, this bill is a start in the right direction.
S.773, the Cybersecurity Act of 2009, was introduced in April 2009 by Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) and currently has bipartisan support with Sens. Bayh (D-IN), Nelson (D-FL), and Snowe (R-ME) listed as cosponsors. Following the bill's introduction, it was referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. While it may take some time to get the bill out of committee, the findings in the bill's full text (see section 2) indicate just how urgent the need is to protect cyberspace.
Even after this legislation (modest in its goals, by Granger's assessment) is passed, there are many major challenges that face a good domestic policy. For example: Section 21 of the Bill, International Norms and Cybersecurity Deterrance Measures, speaks to the need to work with other states and foreign institutions, so that cyberlaw can coherrently govern activity that affects multiple states. Nevertheless, as Granger suggests, this bill is a start in the right direction.
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
CFR Interview on the Afghan Election Crisis
With President Hamid Karzai's announcement that he will participate in a runoff vote on November 7, achieving electoral legitimacy remains a compelling task.
Today at CFR.org, an interview with Peter Manikas yields insight on the roles of the IEC (Independent Election Commission) and the ECC (Election Complaints Commission). The IEC is comprised entirely of members of the Afghan government, and will carry out the runoff election. The ECC is comprised of international and Afghan officials.
As Manikas suggests in the interview, much responsibility for a successful runoff (in terms of procedural integrity) will likely rest on the IEC.
Today at CFR.org, an interview with Peter Manikas yields insight on the roles of the IEC (Independent Election Commission) and the ECC (Election Complaints Commission). The IEC is comprised entirely of members of the Afghan government, and will carry out the runoff election. The ECC is comprised of international and Afghan officials.
As Manikas suggests in the interview, much responsibility for a successful runoff (in terms of procedural integrity) will likely rest on the IEC.
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Lithuania Yet to Decide on Guantanamo Inmates
Globalsecurity.org links to an article by the RIA Novosti news service, on Lithuania's delay to accept Guantanamo inmates. Dalia Grybauskaite, current Lithuanian President, insists that Lithuania's role in secret CIA prisons must be disproven before they will take in any Guantanamo detainees.
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
Professor Julian Ku's Observations on Senator DeMint's Honduras Trip
Last week in the Wall Street Journal, Senator Jim DeMint (R-NC) authored a WSJ Op-Ed highly critical of the Obama Administration's policy toward Honduras. Honduras is currently governed by de facto President Roberto Micheletti; however, the Obama administration recognizes the ousted Manuel Zelaya as the lawfully elected, de jure President.
DeMint issued this Op-Ed following his trip to Honduras in early October, in which he visited Micheletti, as well as other current Honduran leaders. The opinion piece includes a link to a report by the Law Library for Congress summarizing the Honduran Constitutional basis for Zelaya's removal. The report cites a number of the Honduran Constitutional provisions that provide authority for Zelaya's removal, and support for DeMint's position.
Shortly thereafter, Hofstra Law Professor Julian Ku wrote a piece at OpinioJuris, with the first item dealing with the challenges that the DeMint trip posed for the "one voice" element of US foreign policy. If DeMint waited until his return and the subsequent WSJ Op-Ed to make those criticisms, those statements, as Professor Ku, are fair game. Professor Ku's next observation raises an interesting point: "On the other hand, suppose he was careful not so say anything whil in Honduras, but then he launches this broadside only when he got home. I suppose there is not a big difference now that everyone is reading it on the Internet anyway." Is this is a valid argument? Perhaps Senator DeMint was aware that saving his criticisms for the return trip home would not prevent him from reaching a target audience in Micheletti.
DeMint issued this Op-Ed following his trip to Honduras in early October, in which he visited Micheletti, as well as other current Honduran leaders. The opinion piece includes a link to a report by the Law Library for Congress summarizing the Honduran Constitutional basis for Zelaya's removal. The report cites a number of the Honduran Constitutional provisions that provide authority for Zelaya's removal, and support for DeMint's position.
Shortly thereafter, Hofstra Law Professor Julian Ku wrote a piece at OpinioJuris, with the first item dealing with the challenges that the DeMint trip posed for the "one voice" element of US foreign policy. If DeMint waited until his return and the subsequent WSJ Op-Ed to make those criticisms, those statements, as Professor Ku, are fair game. Professor Ku's next observation raises an interesting point: "On the other hand, suppose he was careful not so say anything whil in Honduras, but then he launches this broadside only when he got home. I suppose there is not a big difference now that everyone is reading it on the Internet anyway." Is this is a valid argument? Perhaps Senator DeMint was aware that saving his criticisms for the return trip home would not prevent him from reaching a target audience in Micheletti.
Thursday, October 1, 2009
US, the International Community, and Iran Sanctions
While it's trite to say that international legal norms and institutions are only as strong as major international players allow, Iran's nuclear program is a painfully clear example of this principle at work. For Iran sanctions to carry the United Nations' imprimatur and its concomitant influence, the United States must deal with the practical reality of winning Russian and Chinese support.
Winning the support of these two major players is not an easy task, and it involves factors that go beyond the immediate scope of Iran sanctions. The Obama Administration's decision to reverse the Bush policy of missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic comes with the hope that Russia will respond in kind. On one hand, this gesture (at least ostensibly) reduces any physical threat to Russia, meeting the expressed concern of its government. On the other hand, some analysts suggest that Russia's concern is more for outward appearances, and a means of gaining as much American concession as possible. (In the following link, CFR scholar James M. Lindsay describes the Bush approach as more of a “useful whipping boy for Moscow rather than a genuine strategic threat”: http://www.cfr.org/publication/20224/obamas_missile_shield_revision.html)
As major players deal with these and other practical concerns behind implementing sanctions, concerns over the pace of Iranian nuclear development have been further spurred by new information about a nuclear facility outside of Qom. News of the Qom site has fueled calls from American political leaders for quick implementation of sanctions, the possibility of military strikes, and in some cases, regime change. (Youtube clip of Sen. McCain clarifying his position on regime change: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4cu74ak5g38)
The Iranian regime claims that this site, though too small for civilian purposes, has violated no provision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. More specifically, Iran has asserted that its eventual disclosure of the Qom site was in compliance with an NPT provision requiring notification of such a site within 180 days of its establishment. Although it’s possible that Iran has complied with this provision, neither this nor the 2003 cessation of its nuclear weapons program (according to the November 2007 US NIE) change the fact that Iran has continued to develop the capability for the production of fissile material. This existing capability and the difficulties of treaty enforcement suggest weaknesses in the NPT. (For the full text of the NPT, see the following link: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html)
What happens if the United States is successful in leading the UN Security Council to implement sanctions? This first step is a heavy task, and may only continue the incomplete effects of sanctions against the Islamic Republic. If recent history is any indicator, political change is not a fait accompli under economic sanctions. On that note, my colleague Mora Namdar will provide some commentary on the human dimension of this issue, and how popular will in the US and in Iran may lend toward international action. Also, early next week, we’ll add a more in-depth post on the provisions of the NPT and how they relate to the Iranian nuclear issue.
Winning the support of these two major players is not an easy task, and it involves factors that go beyond the immediate scope of Iran sanctions. The Obama Administration's decision to reverse the Bush policy of missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic comes with the hope that Russia will respond in kind. On one hand, this gesture (at least ostensibly) reduces any physical threat to Russia, meeting the expressed concern of its government. On the other hand, some analysts suggest that Russia's concern is more for outward appearances, and a means of gaining as much American concession as possible. (In the following link, CFR scholar James M. Lindsay describes the Bush approach as more of a “useful whipping boy for Moscow rather than a genuine strategic threat”: http://www.cfr.org/publication/20224/obamas_missile_shield_revision.html)
As major players deal with these and other practical concerns behind implementing sanctions, concerns over the pace of Iranian nuclear development have been further spurred by new information about a nuclear facility outside of Qom. News of the Qom site has fueled calls from American political leaders for quick implementation of sanctions, the possibility of military strikes, and in some cases, regime change. (Youtube clip of Sen. McCain clarifying his position on regime change: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4cu74ak5g38)
The Iranian regime claims that this site, though too small for civilian purposes, has violated no provision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. More specifically, Iran has asserted that its eventual disclosure of the Qom site was in compliance with an NPT provision requiring notification of such a site within 180 days of its establishment. Although it’s possible that Iran has complied with this provision, neither this nor the 2003 cessation of its nuclear weapons program (according to the November 2007 US NIE) change the fact that Iran has continued to develop the capability for the production of fissile material. This existing capability and the difficulties of treaty enforcement suggest weaknesses in the NPT. (For the full text of the NPT, see the following link: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html)
What happens if the United States is successful in leading the UN Security Council to implement sanctions? This first step is a heavy task, and may only continue the incomplete effects of sanctions against the Islamic Republic. If recent history is any indicator, political change is not a fait accompli under economic sanctions. On that note, my colleague Mora Namdar will provide some commentary on the human dimension of this issue, and how popular will in the US and in Iran may lend toward international action. Also, early next week, we’ll add a more in-depth post on the provisions of the NPT and how they relate to the Iranian nuclear issue.
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
UN Condemns 'War Crimes' in Gaza
BBC News reports that a UN report on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that ended at the beginning of 2009, concludes that there is evidence that war crimes were committed on both sides. The report cites Israel's collective punishment of Gazans, and other actions amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)