Showing posts with label nuclear proliferation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nuclear proliferation. Show all posts

Thursday, November 5, 2009

CFR Video of Baradei Speech on Iran's Nuclear Program

Given Wednesday's numerous news pieces dealing with Iran - Israel's interception of materials potentially bound for Iran, protests occuring in Iran - I felt it would be appropriate to provide a link to this lecture by Mohamed El Baradei.

Speaking at the New York office of the Council of Foreign Relations, El Baradei again asserted the need for ongoing dialogue and his skepticism of sanctions.

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

North Korea Claims Further Nuclear Progress

The North Korean regime has recently stated that it has finished the reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods for weaponized plutonium. If these claims are accurate, this weaponized material can be used in a bomb.

Many are concerned that the Taepodong-2, a long-range missile, is a delivery system capable of striking North America. With the threat of more weapons materials and the reactivation of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, North Korea hopes to force the United States into bilateral talks where it may acquire aid, and possible diplomatic recognition.

Following concerns over CTBT ratification by some more hawkish political leaders (Sen. Jon Kyl in the WSJ, for example), the United States response to North Korea will be closely scrutinized by domestic critics of the Obama Administration.

IAEA Chief Calls For A Quick Iranian Decision

Mohammed el-Baradei, head of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency says Iran should make a timely response to an offer to export and reprocess much of Iran's nuclear stockpile. Iran had announced that it would export almost three-quarters of its stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU) for reprocessing into fuel for its medical experimental rector by Russia and France. According to estimates, this would have left Iran without enough LEU to process into a nuclear weapon.

But Iran has been reluctant to take a clear position on its willingness to export any LEU, and had at one point announced it would keep its LEU and buy fuel for its reactor on the open market. All of this comes in the wake of a revelation that Iran has a second, smaller plant for enriching its uranium stockpile.

El-Baradei said that a clear willingness to export its nuclear stockpile would be a powerful gesture from Iran that it was only interested in nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. However, the IAEA chief warned against the use of force to prevent nuclear proliferation, reminding the world community, possibly Israel and the United States specifically, that the invasion of Iraq was premised on a search for weapons of mass destruction.

Read more at RFE/RL.

Sunday, October 25, 2009

UN Inspectors Make Their First Visit to Iran's Second Nuclear Enrichment Facility

UN inspectors made their first visit to recently disclosed second nuclear enrichment facility near the town of Qom. According to the Jerusalem Post, the facility is named Fordo, after the village that had the largest percentage of fighters killed in the Iran-Iraq war. Inspectors are expected to complete a report on the site after they leave Iran later this week. This inspection comes the week after a meeting in Zurich where Iran announced that rather than exporting 75% of its low enriched uranium for reprocessing, it would rather buy highly enriched uranium on the open market.

Watch a short Al Jazeera story at Youtube.

Thursday, October 22, 2009

Iran, Israel Attend secret Nuclear Meeting in Cairo

Israeli and Iranian atomic energy officials met at a meeting in Cairo last month according to the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission. The meeting was held under the auspices of the Internaltional Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and included representatives from the Arab League, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Jordon, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and U.S. and European officials. Iran has denied the report. Read more at the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Haaretz, Xinhua and Al Jazeera.

Wednesday, October 21, 2009

Iran Nuclear Fuel Agreement Put Forth by IAEA; Good deal for Iran

The IAEA submitted a draft agreement to Iran, France, Russia and the U.S. Although details are unconfirmed, it appears the agreement would involve Iran exporting uranium to France and Russia for enrichment. While in a simple form this plan appears to be concilitory and functional, I have doubts it will really solve the issues at hand. First, Iran believes it has a right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, which is not addressed by this plan where that right is still only entrusted to other nations. Second, if Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons via uranium enrichment programs secretly, as has been claimed, this plan will have to include new guarentees for verifying the enrichment programs have been halted, a process that has thus far evaded international efforts. From a national defense prospective, Iran is wise to want to acquire a bomb. If it intends to continue developing one in secret, Iran still has no reason to reject the IAEA's proposal. There will no doubt be considerable foreign funding for exportation of uranium and it's enrichment. By accepting the plan, Iran will simultaneously gain less expensive energy bolstered by foreign aid, lift sanctions against it, get back in the world's good graces and, theoretically, be able to continue the covert development of a nuclear weapon. Seems like a good deal.

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

Iran Might Go Back to France For Uranium Enrichment

Al Jazeera reported that there was a draft document circulating in Vienna today that might allow Iran and France to hammer out a deal to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) for Iran's medical research reactor. Having earlier rejected France for not going through with a deal to supply HEU, Iran might contract with Russia to enrich Iran's low enriched uranium (LEU) into fuel rods, and then Russia would sub-contract with France.

Earlier this year, Iran promised to export close to 75% of its LEU to France for reprocessing, and avoided harsher UN sanctions. However, Iran said it would process its own HEU if the current talks in Vienna do not yield a satisfactory result, and Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki said that Iran will not give up its "legal and obvious" right to nuclear technology.

Monday, October 19, 2009

Iran Announces it Will Not Export Uranium

Iran had announced, after talks on October 1, that it would export approximately 75% of its estimated 1.5 tons of low-enriched uranium (LEU), to be processed by Russian and France into the highly-enriched uranium (HEU) that it needs for medicine and energy production. But the Telegraph reported that on state television today, Iranian officials suggested that they wish to keep their current stockpile of LEU, and import all of the HEU they need. The Telegraph says that the amount of LEU that Iran is known to possess is enough to yield enough HEU for one nuclear weapon, after the lengthly enrichment process.

ElBaradi Says Nuclear Talks Start Out Well

Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA Chief, said that talks today in Vienna between US, Russian, French and Iranian officials have started out well, Al Jazeera reported today. Iran had earlier announced that they would continue to enrich uranium if these talks did not go well.

Iran is claiming the right to further enrich low-enriched uranium (LEU) to produce cancer-fighting isotopes. Iran delayed harsh UN sanctions by agreeing to the current four-party talks and consider sending its low-enriched uranium abroad for further enrichment to produce medical products and to create electricity.

A spokesman for the Iranian nuclear agency said that it is not feasible economically for Iran to enrich LEU it need to produce the 150-300 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) it needs to fuel its electric reactor. But, the spokesman said, Iran would produce HEU if the current Vienna talks did not produce the results Tehran wants.

Read more at NYTimes.

Friday, October 16, 2009

Clinton expresses confidence in Pakistani Nukes

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and British Secretary of State David Miliband said Sunday that they have confidence in the security of Pakistani nuclear weapons. The announcement came the day after an attack against a military command center in Rawalpindi. Two of the attackers had served in the Pakistani military, and all attackers were wearing army uniforms and took hostages at a heavily guarded military site. Read more at the Washington Post.

Tuesday, October 13, 2009

Russia Rejects Further Iranian Sanctions

Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, said all effort to deal with the Iranian nuclear program should focus on talks with Iran, and further sanctions would be counterproductive. Read more at Al Jezeera or Pravda.ru.

Threats of Sanctions against Iran won’t work according to Russia

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov today. Lavrov stated that the threat of sanctions against Iran will not work to inhibit them from working on the nuclear program. This is a massive setback to the Obama administrations plan to present a unified effort to pressure the Iranian regime into compliance. Russia and China have been wavering in their support of both the U.S. policy on the nuclear program and aiding the Iranian regime. To read more, click here AP.

Friday, October 9, 2009

The Iranian Opposition Movement: A Green Opportunity

With the recent public discovery of an Iranian nuclear facility in Qom, the Obama administration has taken a stance of pushing sanctions with international support. If the Obama administration can garner the support it needs from Russia, China, and most of Western Europe, any eventual sanctions may actually have some teeth. The Iranians, however, have been masterful at maneuvering around sanctions. Even if the sanctions are imposed, not all sanctions are so called “smart sanctions” which would target the power players in the regime and not the average person on the street who is just trying to live their life and feed their family. Smart sanctions are meant to target the regime in power with as little effect on the general population as possible. (The definitive work on “smart sanctions” to date was written by David Cortright and George Lopez in Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft.)

If “smart sanctions” are not imposed and an ineffective policy is adopted by the International Community, it will allow the Iranian regime to once again externalize conflict and distract attention from their severe domestic crisis. With this summer’s domestic unrest, the Iranian regime has lost legitimacy at home and abroad. The people continue protests daily at Tehran University regardless of the massive arrests, human rights violations, and mass show trials implemented by the regime.

The greatest example of the sophistication of the conflict and continued resistance of the Iranian opposition to their own regime was captured on video on September 18th, shortly before Ahmadinejad’s trip to the UN, where the government run demonstrations were held and Iranian agents tried to lead the crowd with chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.” The people in the crowd would not repeat those chants and instead chanted “Death to Russia” and “Death to China” in response to those chants, respectively (video available here). The Iranian people are well aware of the supporters of the regime vs. the supporters of the popular will. They refused to demonize the U.S. and Israel and showed their opposition to Russia and China whom greatly support the regime. The Russians and Chinese have been unwilling to put sanctions on the Iranian regime and Russia was one of the first states to recognize Ahmadenijad as President after the contested elections of this summer.

At this point, the Obama administration and similarly-minded allies are presented with a great opportunity for preventing Iranian nuclear weapons capability. The argument made by the Iranian regime is that every nation has the "right" to nuclear energy. A regime has to be stable and legitimate before it can or should have the "right" to nuclear power. The steps in between enriching uranium for nuclear power to that which is needed for medicinal or bomb uses is not very far from one another. Producing one de facto gives you nuclear weapons capability. Even if it is the simple nuclear waste from a nuclear energy facility, that nuclear waste can be put into a so called "dirty bomb." Allowing this to be put in the hands of an illigitmate regime is irresponsible and reckless.

With President Obama's award of the Nobel Peace Prize yesterday, he has been given a responsibility to preserve the integrity of that prize. The policy of appeasement reflected poorly on the governments and leaders who appeased Hitler's regime and the same will be the case for any leaders that allow the slaughter of innocent people in Iran. According to the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of Genocide, genocide is "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part." In light of the New York protests against Ahmadinejad carried out by more than 15 thousand members of the Iranian-American diaspora (video available here), any failure for the Obama Administration to act could measure up to a lost opportunity.

Thursday, October 1, 2009

US, the International Community, and Iran Sanctions

While it's trite to say that international legal norms and institutions are only as strong as major international players allow, Iran's nuclear program is a painfully clear example of this principle at work. For Iran sanctions to carry the United Nations' imprimatur and its concomitant influence, the United States must deal with the practical reality of winning Russian and Chinese support.

Winning the support of these two major players is not an easy task, and it involves factors that go beyond the immediate scope of Iran sanctions. The Obama Administration's decision to reverse the Bush policy of missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic comes with the hope that Russia will respond in kind. On one hand, this gesture (at least ostensibly) reduces any physical threat to Russia, meeting the expressed concern of its government. On the other hand, some analysts suggest that Russia's concern is more for outward appearances, and a means of gaining as much American concession as possible. (In the following link, CFR scholar James M. Lindsay describes the Bush approach as more of a “useful whipping boy for Moscow rather than a genuine strategic threat”: http://www.cfr.org/publication/20224/obamas_missile_shield_revision.html)

As major players deal with these and other practical concerns behind implementing sanctions, concerns over the pace of Iranian nuclear development have been further spurred by new information about a nuclear facility outside of Qom. News of the Qom site has fueled calls from American political leaders for quick implementation of sanctions, the possibility of military strikes, and in some cases, regime change. (Youtube clip of Sen. McCain clarifying his position on regime change: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4cu74ak5g38)

The Iranian regime claims that this site, though too small for civilian purposes, has violated no provision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. More specifically, Iran has asserted that its eventual disclosure of the Qom site was in compliance with an NPT provision requiring notification of such a site within 180 days of its establishment. Although it’s possible that Iran has complied with this provision, neither this nor the 2003 cessation of its nuclear weapons program (according to the November 2007 US NIE) change the fact that Iran has continued to develop the capability for the production of fissile material. This existing capability and the difficulties of treaty enforcement suggest weaknesses in the NPT. (For the full text of the NPT, see the following link: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html)

What happens if the United States is successful in leading the UN Security Council to implement sanctions? This first step is a heavy task, and may only continue the incomplete effects of sanctions against the Islamic Republic. If recent history is any indicator, political change is not a fait accompli under economic sanctions. On that note, my colleague Mora Namdar will provide some commentary on the human dimension of this issue, and how popular will in the US and in Iran may lend toward international action. Also, early next week, we’ll add a more in-depth post on the provisions of the NPT and how they relate to the Iranian nuclear issue.