China's Support for Bilateral Talks Between U.S. and North Korea

RIA Novosti reports that the PRC supports bilateral talks between the US and North Korea. The PRC views these talks as a vehicle for reviving the six-party talks which North Korea abandoned in protest in April.

Currently, UN Resolution 1718, adopted in October of 2006, prohibits North Korea from nuclear and ballistic missile tests. However, the North Korean has violated this resolution with a nuclear test, as well as a number of short-range missile launches.

CFR Video of Baradei Speech on Iran's Nuclear Program

Given Wednesday's numerous news pieces dealing with Iran - Israel's interception of materials potentially bound for Iran, protests occuring in Iran - I felt it would be appropriate to provide a link to this lecture by Mohamed El Baradei.

Speaking at the New York office of the Council of Foreign Relations, El Baradei again asserted the need for ongoing dialogue and his skepticism of sanctions.

North Korea Claims Further Nuclear Progress

The North Korean regime has recently stated that it has finished the reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods for weaponized plutonium. If these claims are accurate, this weaponized material can be used in a bomb.

Many are concerned that the Taepodong-2, a long-range missile, is a delivery system capable of striking North America. With the threat of more weapons materials and the reactivation of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, North Korea hopes to force the United States into bilateral talks where it may acquire aid, and possible diplomatic recognition.

Following concerns over CTBT ratification by some more hawkish political leaders (Sen. Jon Kyl in the WSJ, for example), the United States response to North Korea will be closely scrutinized by domestic critics of the Obama Administration.

Iran Nuclear Fuel Agreement Put Forth by IAEA; Good deal for Iran

The IAEA submitted a draft agreement to Iran, France, Russia and the U.S. Although details are unconfirmed, it appears the agreement would involve Iran exporting uranium to France and Russia for enrichment. While in a simple form this plan appears to be concilitory and functional, I have doubts it will really solve the issues at hand. First, Iran believes it has a right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, which is not addressed by this plan where that right is still only entrusted to other nations. Second, if Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons via uranium enrichment programs secretly, as has been claimed, this plan will have to include new guarentees for verifying the enrichment programs have been halted, a process that has thus far evaded international efforts. From a national defense prospective, Iran is wise to want to acquire a bomb. If it intends to continue developing one in secret, Iran still has no reason to reject the IAEA's proposal. There will no doubt be considerable foreign funding for exportation of uranium and it's enrichment. By accepting the plan, Iran will simultaneously gain less expensive energy bolstered by foreign aid, lift sanctions against it, get back in the world's good graces and, theoretically, be able to continue the covert development of a nuclear weapon. Seems like a good deal.

Karzai Likely to Admit to Insufficient Vote Result

As was posted earlier, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is facing increased political pressure following the Afghan presidential election. AP has just reported that Karzai may likely admit that he did not breach the 50% electoral result necessary to avoid a runnoff.

The election results and Karzai's subsequent conduct will have significant consequences for US foreign policy in South Asia, and could potentially have long-lasting effects on US national security interests.

US Missile Shield Talks, Non-NATO Members, and Russia

RIA Novosti reports that Russia has expressed concern about the United States' missile shield talks with non-NATO ally Ukraine.

As we noted in a previous post, some analysts merely viewed previous missile shield agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic as useful bogeymen for Russian policymakers (despite the minimal actual strategic threat). Although Ukraine is not included in NATO, is this merely a cosmetic difference? And if so, is this simple difference enough to give Moscow a new "useful whipping boy?"

If one can answer affirmatively to all of the above, any such US missile-shield talks may offer the Russians the excuse they need to avoid cooperating on UNSC Iran sanctions.

US, the International Community, and Iran Sanctions

While it's trite to say that international legal norms and institutions are only as strong as major international players allow, Iran's nuclear program is a painfully clear example of this principle at work. For Iran sanctions to carry the United Nations' imprimatur and its concomitant influence, the United States must deal with the practical reality of winning Russian and Chinese support.

Winning the support of these two major players is not an easy task, and it involves factors that go beyond the immediate scope of Iran sanctions. The Obama Administration's decision to reverse the Bush policy of missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic comes with the hope that Russia will respond in kind. On one hand, this gesture (at least ostensibly) reduces any physical threat to Russia, meeting the expressed concern of its government. On the other hand, some analysts suggest that Russia's concern is more for outward appearances, and a means of gaining as much American concession as possible. (In the following link, CFR scholar James M. Lindsay describes the Bush approach as more of a “useful whipping boy for Moscow rather than a genuine strategic threat”: http://www.cfr.org/publication/20224/obamas_missile_shield_revision.html)

As major players deal with these and other practical concerns behind implementing sanctions, concerns over the pace of Iranian nuclear development have been further spurred by new information about a nuclear facility outside of Qom. News of the Qom site has fueled calls from American political leaders for quick implementation of sanctions, the possibility of military strikes, and in some cases, regime change. (Youtube clip of Sen. McCain clarifying his position on regime change: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4cu74ak5g38)

The Iranian regime claims that this site, though too small for civilian purposes, has violated no provision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. More specifically, Iran has asserted that its eventual disclosure of the Qom site was in compliance with an NPT provision requiring notification of such a site within 180 days of its establishment. Although it’s possible that Iran has complied with this provision, neither this nor the 2003 cessation of its nuclear weapons program (according to the November 2007 US NIE) change the fact that Iran has continued to develop the capability for the production of fissile material. This existing capability and the difficulties of treaty enforcement suggest weaknesses in the NPT. (For the full text of the NPT, see the following link: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html)

What happens if the United States is successful in leading the UN Security Council to implement sanctions? This first step is a heavy task, and may only continue the incomplete effects of sanctions against the Islamic Republic. If recent history is any indicator, political change is not a fait accompli under economic sanctions. On that note, my colleague Mora Namdar will provide some commentary on the human dimension of this issue, and how popular will in the US and in Iran may lend toward international action. Also, early next week, we’ll add a more in-depth post on the provisions of the NPT and how they relate to the Iranian nuclear issue.